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Secure two-party cryptography is possible if the adversary’s quantum storage device suffers im-
perfections. For example, security can be achieved if the adversary can store strictly less then half
of the qubits transmitted during the protocol. This special case is known as the bounded-storage
model, and it has long been an open question whether security can still be achieved if the adversary’s
storage were any larger. Here, we answer this question positively and demonstrate a two-party pro-
tocol which is secure as long as the adversary cannot store even a small fraction of the transmitted
pulses. We also show that security can be extended to a larger class of noisy quantum memories.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two-party cryptography enables Alice and Bob to
solve problems in cooperation even if they do not trust
each other. Important examples of such tasks include
auctions and secure identification. In the latter, Alice
wants to identify herself to Bob (possibly a fraudulent
ATM machine) without revealing her password. More
generally, Alice and Bob wish to solve problems where
Alice holds an input x (e.g. her password) and Bob holds
an input y (e.g. the password an honest Alice should pos-
sess), and they want to obtain the value of some function
f(x, y) (e.g. ‘yes’ if x = y, and ‘no’ otherwise), as de-
picted in Fig. I. Security means that Alice should not
learn anything about y and Bob should not learn any-
thing about x, apart from what can be inferred from
f(x, y) [1].
Contrary to quantum key distribution where honest
Alice and Bob can work together to detect the presence
of an outside eavesdropper [2, 3], two-party cryptogra-
phy is made difficult by the fact that Alice and Bob do
not trust each other and have to fend for themselves. In-
deed, two-party cryptography is impossible without mak-
ing assumptions about the adversary, even when we allow
quantum communication [4]. The security of most cryp-
tographic systems in use today is based on the premise
that certain computational problems are hard to solve
for the adversary. Concretely, security relies on the as-
sumption that the adversary’s computational resources
are limited, and the underlying problem is hard in some
FIG. 1: Secure Identification
precise complexity-theoretic sense. While the former as-
sumption may be justified in practice, the latter state-
ment is usually an unproven mathematical conjecture.
It is thus a natural question whether other, more phys-
ical assumptions regarding the two parties’ resources al-
low us to obtain security without relying on any addi-
tional hardness results. This is indeed known to be pos-
sible if we assume that the adversary’s classical [5–7] or
quantum storage is limited [8–10] or more generally if his
memory is simply imperfect [11–13].
Concretely, the assumption of the noisy-storage model
entails that during waiting times ∆t in a protocol, the
adversary has to measure/discard all his quantum infor-
mation except what he can encode (arbitrarily) into his
quantum memory. Any quantum storage can be mod-
eled as a completely positive trace preserving (CPTP)
map F : B(Hin) → B(Hout), that maps states ρ ∈ Hin
to some noisy states F(ρ) ∈ Hout. In this paper, we fo-
cus on the case where the input space is an n-fold tensor
product Hin ∼= (Cd)⊗ν·n, the protocols involve n-qudits
of communication and the noise is of the form F ≡ N⊗ν·n
with N : B(Cd)→ B(Cd). The constant ν > 0 is referred
to as the storage rate as it captures the fraction of the
transmitted qudits that could could potentially be stored
by the adversary.
Clearly, the storage rate ν plays a crucial role in decid-
ing whether security can be obtained from a particular
storage device. For example, in the case of bounded stor-
age where we have no noise (N = I), we can never hope
to obtain security if the adversary can store all quantum
information made available to him during the protocol,
that is, if ν = 1 and the input space is Hin = (Cd)⊗n.
Apart from this trivial condition, however, no bounds
were known that restrict our ability to obtain security.
In [9] it was shown that security can be achieved in a
protocol based on qubits (d = 2) as long as ν < 1/4.
This was improved to ν < 1/2 in [13]. More generally, it
was shown that security in the noisy-storage model can
be obtained [13] if
CN · ν <
1
2
, (1)
2where CN is the classical capacity of the quantum chan-
nel N .
A. Results
Here, we show that for the case of bounded storage, se-
curity can be obtained if the cheating party can store all
but a constant fraction of the transmitted pulses. That is,
the trivial condition ν < 1 stated above is in fact optimal!
The honest players thereby need no quantum storage at
all in order to execute the protocol. This not only set-
tles the question, but also highlights the sharp contrast
to the case of classical bounded storage, where it was
shown that security can only be obtained if the adver-
sary’s classical storage is at most quadratic in the storage
required by the honest players [14]. Unlike the protocols
in [8, 9, 11, 13] which use BB84 encoded qubits [2], we
make use of states encoded in higher-dimensional mu-
tually unbiased bases [33]. Of course, we also scale the
storage size accordingly to Hin = (Cd)⊗ν·n when send-
ing d dimensional states. More specifically, we show that
security in the setting of bounded storage is possible as
long as
ν <
log(d+ 1)− 1
log d
→ 1 , (2)
where the r.h.s. approaches 1 for large d. We stress that
for large values of d, the resulting protocols will be much
harder to implement experimentally, and even though
the errors decrease exponentially with n they converge
very slowly for large d. Note, however, that here we are
merely interested in exploring the fundamental physical
limitations of this model.
For the general setting of noisy quantum storage we
further show that security is possible for devices F =
N⊗ν·n, where the channel N : B(Cd) → B(Cd) satisfies
the strong converse property [15], whenever
CN · ν < log(d+ 1)− 1 , (3)
thus extending the range of storage devices for which
we can prove security [13]. Our proof thereby relies on
an uncertainty relation for mutually unbiased bases, but
is completely general in the sense that any other set of
encodings satisfying such a relation could be used in our
protocol instead.
We would like to emphasize that that the setting con-
sidered here differs greatly from quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) [2, 3], where higher dimensional states have
also been used to some advantage. In QKD, Alice and
Bob trust each other, but are trying to protect themselves
from an outside eavesdropper. An important advantage
gained by Alice and Bob in this setting is that they can
work together to try and detect interference by such an
eavesdropper. In contrast, in the scenario we are consid-
ering there is no analogous way for Alice to check on any
of Bob’s actions, and vice versa. Hence, we require an en-
tirely different proof of security as used in quantum key
distribution, and whereas results from QKD may pro-
vide some clues, they give only very little indication that
higher dimensional states are useful for our problem.
B. Techniques
We first give an overview of the steps involved in ob-
taining our result. The constant 1/2 in the bound (1)
is a result of using BB84 states [2] in the protocol, and
stems from an uncertainty relation for measurements in
these two bases [16]. It is thus natural to consider a pro-
tocol that uses more than two mutually unbiased bases
(MUBs) for which uncertainty relations are known to ex-
ist [17]. Our first step is to obtain a modified protocol
for the simple two-party primitive weak string erasure
which was originally introduced in [13], using the full set
of d + 1 MUBs that are known to exist in prime power
dimensions [18, 19]. Next, we show that there is still a se-
cure protocol for the cryptographic primitive of oblivious
transfer using this variant of weak string erasure. This
is done by purely classical post-processing of the output
of the quantum primitive weak string erasure. Since it
is known that any two-party cryptographic problem can
be solved using oblivious transfer [20], this concludes our
claim.
II. WEAK STRING ERASURE
We first show how to obtain a variant of the very sim-
ple cryptographic primitive weak string erasure (WSE)
introduced in [13], which we will call non-uniform weak
string erasure; a formal definition can be found in Ap-
pendix A. Intuitively, this primitive provides Alice with a
string Xn = (X1, ..., Xn) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d− 1}n, where each
entry Xi takes on one of d possible values. Bob obtains
a set of index locations I = {i1, ..., i|I| | ij ∈ [n]}, where
any index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} =: [n] is chosen to be in I with
some probability p. In addition, Bob receives the entries
of the string Xn corresponding to the indices I, which we
denote by the substring XI = (Xi1 , Xi2 , . . . , Xi|I|). Se-
curity here means that even if Alice is dishonest, she can-
not learn which entries are known to Bob, i.e., she cannot
learn anything about the index set I. Conversely, if Bob
is dishonest, then his information about the entire string
Xn should still be limited in the sense that the probabil-
ity that he can guess all of Xn given his information B′
is small. That is,
Pguess(X |B
′) ≤ 2−λn . (4)
for some λ > 0. This is equivalent [21] to demanding that
his min-entropy [22] denoted as H∞(X
n|B′)ρ, obeys
H∞(X
n|B′)ρ = − logPguess(X
n|B′) ≥ λn . (5)
In practice, we allow this condition to fail with error
parameter ε, which corresponds to demanding that the
3smooth min-entropy defined as
Hε∞(X
n|B′)ρ (6)
:= sup
ρ¯XnB′≥0
1
2 ‖ρ¯XnB′−ρXnB′‖1≤tr(ρXnB′ )·ε
tr(ρ¯XnB′)≤tr(ρXnB′ )
H∞(X
n|B′)ρ¯ ,
satisfies
Hε∞(X
n|B′) ≥ λn . (7)
A. Protocol
Next we outline a simple protocol that achieves the
functionality described above. It is a straightforward
generalization of the original protocol in [13] to multi-
ple encodings, the main difference being that the indices
in I ⊆ [n] are no longer chosen uniformly at random. In-
stead, the probability p that honest Bob learns the value
ofXi for i ∈ [n] is equal to the probability that he chooses
the same basis as Alice, that is, p = 1/(d+ 1). In what
follows, let 2[n] denote the set of all subsets of [n].
Protocol 1: Non-uniform WSE
Outputs: xn ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}n to Alice, (I, z|I|) ∈
2[n] × {0, 1, . . . , d− 1}|I| to Bob.
1: Alice: Picks an n-dit string uniformly at random,
xn ∈ {0, 1, ..., d − 1}n. She encodes each dit into
one of the d + 1 MUBs, Bθ1, . . . ,Bθn , that is, she
chooses a basis string θn = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ {0, ..., d}n
uniformly at random, so that the dit xj is encoded
in basis Bθj , and sends it to Bob.
2: Bob: Chooses a basis string θ˜n ∈ {0, 1, ..., d}n
uniformly at random. When receiving the i-th
qudit, he measures it in the basis Bθ˜i, to obtain
outcome x˜i.
Both parties wait time ∆t.
3: Alice: Sends the basis information θn to Bob,
and outputs xn.
4: Bob: Computes I := {i ∈ [n]|θi = θ˜i}, and
outputs (I, x˜I).
We now formally state our claim that this protocol
does indeed implement non-uniform WSE, with the pa-
rameters ε, λ and d.
Theorem 1. Let Bob’s storage be given by F = N⊗νn
with a storage rate ν > 0, where N satisfies the strong
converse property [15] and the capacity CN of the channel
N bounded by
CN · ν < log(d+ 1)− 1 . (8)
Let δ ∈]0, 12 − CN · ν[. Then, Protocol 1 securely imple-
ments weak string erasure for sufficiently large n with
λ(δ, d) = ν · γN
(
log(d+ 1)− 1− δ
ν
)
(9)
and error ε(δ, d) = 2 exp(−f(δ, d)n) with
f(δ, d) ∝ −δ2/ (log((d+ 1) · d) + log 4/δ)2 > 0, (10)
where γN (·) is the strong converse parameter of N [15].
Note that for bounded storage, where N is simply the
identity channel over Bob’s d-dimensional input Hilbert
space, CN = log d in (8), which directly implies our cen-
tral result (2).
It is easy to see that the protocol is correct if both
parties are honest: if Alice is honest, her string Xn = xn
is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1, . . . , d− 1}n as
desired, and if Bob is honest, he clearly obtains x˜i = xi
whenever i ∈ I for a random subset I ⊆ [n]. In the
remainder of this section, we prove security if one of the
parties is dishonest.
B. Security against dishonest Bob
First of all, we need to show that even if Bob is dis-
honest, he can nevertheless not learn much about the
entire string Xn. In other words, our goal is to show
that there exists some λ > 0 satisfying (7). Our proof
proceeds in three steps; technical details can be found in
Appendix A. First, we consider Bob’s information about
the string Xn given only his classical information K, and
the basis information Θn he receives. This can be quan-
tified using entropic uncertainty relations in terms of the
Shannon entropy for d+ 1 MUBs in Cd [17].
Using [23, Theorem 4.22] these uncertainty relations
imply a bound on Bob’s information in terms of the
smooth min-entropy
Hε/2∞ (X
n|KΘn)ρ ≥
(
log(d+ 1)− 1−
δ
2
)
n , (11)
for any 0 < δ < 12 with ε = 2 exp (−f(δ, d)n), for
f(δ, d) ≥ 0. That is, the error decreases exponentially
with n, as desired. Note that instead of mutually unbi-
ased bases, we could have used any other form of encod-
ings obeying such a strong uncertainty relation.
Next we consider Bob’s information, when in addition
he is given the output of his storage device F(Q). We
know from [13] that the uncertainty relation (11) deter-
mines the rate at which Bob needs to send information
through his storage device. Using [13, Lemma 2.2] to-
gether with (11) we obtain
Hε∞(X
n|ΘnKF(Q))ρ
≥ − logPFsucc
[
n
(
log(d+ 1)− 1−
δ
2
)]
, (12)
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FIG. 2: Security regions (r, ν) for weak string erasure (WSE)
with depolarizing noise N (ρ) = rρ+(1−r)I/d , in dimensions
d = 4, 5. Previously [13], security was shown in the regions
below the dotted black curve for d = 4 and the dot-dashed
green curve for d = 5. Our analysis extends the security
region to the solid blue curve (d = 4) and the dashed red
curve (d = 5) respectively.
where, PFsucc(nR) is the average probability of sending a
randomly chosen string x ∈ {0, 1}nR through the storage
F [34]. For noise of the formF = N⊗νn, the r.h.s. of (12)
is the success probability of sending νn bits at a rate
R = (log(d+1)−1−δ/2)/ν. The final step is to note that
for channels satisfying the strong converse property [15],
this success probability drops off exponentially with n
according to the parameter γN (·), whenever R > CN .
This gives the bound
CN · ν < log(d+ 1)− 1−
δ
2
. (13)
Theorem 1 then follows by noting that exponential se-
curity (in n) is possible for any constant δ > 0. As
an example of how our bound improves upon the ear-
lier bound in [13], we compare the corresponding secu-
rity regions for WSE with depolarizing noise, i.e. when
N (ρ) = rρ+ (1− r)I/d, in Fig. 2.
C. Security against dishonest Alice
When Alice is dishonest, it is intuitively obvious that
she is unable to gain any information about the index
set I, since she never receives any information from Bob
during our protocol. However, a more careful security
analysis is required if we want to use weak string era-
sure to build more complicated primitives like oblivious
transfer. This argument is essentially analogous to [13],
as outlined in Appendix A for completeness.
III. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
Ultimately, we would like to useWSE to solve arbitrary
two-party cryptographic problems. To this end, it suffices
to implement the primitive oblivious transfer [35], which
can solve any two-party problem [20]. Informally, this
primitive outputs two strings Sℓ0, S
ℓ
1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ to Alice,
and a choice bit C ∈ {0, 1} and SℓC to Bob. Security
means that if Alice is dishonest, she should not learn
anything about C. If Bob is dishonest, we demand that
there exists some random variable C such that Bob is
entirely ignorant about Sℓ1−C . That is, he may learn at
most one of the two strings which are generated.
Here, we state a simplified version of the actual pro-
tocol which executes fully randomized oblivious transfer
from WSE. This is a purely classical protocol, using the
quantum primitive WSE. It contains all the essential in-
gredients to understand the main steps of our security
proof. A formal definition, as well as the full protocol
can be found in Appendix B. The only difference from
the protocol presented in [13] is the fact that I is no
longer uniform, and honest Bob only learns about pn
entries xj , whereas in the case of uniform WSE [13] he
could learn roughly n/2. We hence introduce a new pa-
rameter η = 2(d+1) in the protocol, such that with high
probability Bob learns at least n/η of the indices.
Our protocol uses two ingredients, privacy amplifica-
tion and a primitive called interactive hashing, where we
refer to [13] for an overview of these techniques. Pri-
vacy amplification is well-known from its role in quan-
tum key distribution [22]. Although interactive hashing
is well-known within the realm of classical cryptography,
it has only recently found applications in quantum infor-
mation [13]. Intuitively, an interactive hashing protocol
has the following properties: It takes as inputs a subset
Itr (encoded as a string w) from Bob, and outputs two
subsets I0, I1 ∈ [n] (encoded as strings w0, w1) to both
Alice and Bob. The protocol ensures that there exists a
c ∈ {0, 1}, such that Ic = Itr, i.e., one of the two subsets
it outputs is equal to Bob’s original input. Note that
since Bob knows his input, he can of course compute c.
Nevertheless, interactive hashing ensures that Alice can-
not learn which subset is the same as Bob’s input, that
is, Alice cannot learn c. Finally, interactive hashing has
another important property we will need: Whereas Bob
can choose one of these subsets (namely Ic), the choice
of the other subset is not under his control. In fact, I1−c
is essentially chosen at random.
Protocol 2: Oblivious Transfer
Outputs: (sℓ0, s
ℓ
1) ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ×{0, 1}ℓ to Alice, and (c, yℓ) ∈
{0, 1} × {0, 1}ℓ to Bob
1: Alice and Bob: Execute WSE. Alice gets a
string xn ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}n, Bob a set I ⊂ [n]
and a string s = xI . If |I| < n/η, Bob chooses uni-
formly at random a set Itr of size |Itr| = n/η. Oth-
5erwise, he randomly truncates I to |Itr| of size n/η,
and deletes the corresponding values in s.
2: Alice and Bob: Execute interactive hashing with
Bob’s input w equal to a description of Itr =
Enc(w). Interpret the outputs w0 and w1 as de-
scriptions of subsets I0 and I1 of [n].
3: Alice: Chooses r0, r1 ∈R R and sends them to
Bob.
4: Alice: Outputs (sℓ0, s
ℓ
1) := (Ext(xI0 ,r0),Ext(xI1 ,r1))
using Ext : {0, . . . , d − 1}n/η × R → {0, 1}ℓ, the
2-universal hash function known from quantum
key distribution [22].
5: Bob: Computes c ∈ {0, 1} with I = Ic, and xI
from s. He outputs (c, yℓ) := (c,Ext(s, rc)).
We provide only an overview of our proof since it
closely follows the steps in [13]; details can be found in
Appendix B. To show that the protocol is correct we first
use Hoeffding’s inequality [24] to show that except with
exponentially small probability exp(−2n/η), Bob learns a
sufficient number of indices to retrieve the desired string
SC .
A. Security against dishonest Alice
To show that the protocol is secure against a cheating
Alice, we have to show that there is no way for her to
learn C, that is, which of the two strings is known to
honest Bob. We again provide an overview of our proof,
and defer the complete technical details to Appendix B.
First of all, note that the properties of weak string era-
sure ensure that a dishonest Alice does not know which
dits xI of x
n are known to Bob, that is, she is ignorant
about the index set I. This is similar to the proof in [13].
However, for our new protocol we encounter an additional
difficulty since we need that even the truncated set Itr is
uniform over subsets of size n/η, but I is no longer dis-
tributed uniformly over 2[n]. Formally, the probability of
a given truncated set Itr can be written in terms of the
probability p(A¯) that |I| ≥ n/η, as follows:
p(Itr|A¯) =
∑
I
|I|≥n/η
p(I|A¯)( |I|
n/η
) = 1
p(A¯)
∑
I
p(I)( |I|
n/η
) , (14)
independent of the choice of truncation as desired. Here,
1/
( |I|
n/η
)
is the probability of choosing the particular sub-
set Itr from I and p(I|A¯) is the conditional probability of
a set I, given that |I| ≥ n/η. The final equality is simply
an application of Bayes’ rule, p(A¯)p(I|A¯) = p(A¯|I)p(I).
Finally, the fact that Itr is uniform together with the
properties of interactive hashing [25] ensure that she can-
not gain any information which of the two subsets I0 and
I1 of bits are known to Bob. Hence, Alice cannot learn
C as desired.
B. Security against dishonest Bob
Again, it follows from weak string erasure that a dis-
honest Bob gains only a limited amount of information
about the string Xn. The properties of interactive hash-
ing ensure that Bob has very little control over the subset
I1−c chosen by the interactive hashing. Therefore, by the
results on min-entropy sampling [26], Bob has only lim-
ited information about the dits in this subset. Privacy
amplification [22, 27] can then be used to turn this into
almost complete ignorance.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that any two-party cryptographic
primitive can be implemented securely in the setting of
bounded quantum storage, even if the adversary can store
all but a fraction of the transmitted pulses. This is op-
timal, in the sense that we could never hope to achieve
security if the cheating party could store all quantum
communication made available to him. This demon-
strates that there is no physical principle that prevents
us from achieving security even with a very high storage
rate ν < 1. We have also shown in the noisy-storage set-
ting that security is possible for a much larger range of
noisy quantum memories.
To achieve our result we use higher dimensional states
which are very difficult to create in practice. It is there-
fore an interesting open question, whether the same
result could be obtained using merely BB84 encoded
qubits. Note, however, that our approach merely relies
on the existence of entropic uncertainty relations for mul-
tiple encodings, and our protocols and proofs are com-
pletely analogous if we were to use any other encodings
for which strong uncertainty relations are known to exist.
For example, it is conceivable that uncertainty relations
for multiple encodings can be based on top of BB84 en-
coded qubits [28], which would immediately lead to a
protocol that is easy to implement experimentally.
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[34] PFsucc(nR) is given by P
F
succ(nR) =
max{Mx}x,{ρx}x
1
2nR
∑
x∈{0,1}n tr (MxF(ρx)), where
the maximization is taken over encodings {ρx}x and
decoding positive operator valued measures (POVMs)
{Mx}x.
[35] Here we execute fully randomized oblivious transfer [9,
29] which can easily be converted into standard 1-2 obliv-
ious transfer [30, 31].
Appendix A: Weak String Erasure
To formally state our result, let us first define non-
uniform weak string erasure. This definition closely fol-
lows the one of [13], except that the string Xn is now
chosen from a larger alphabet and the indices in I ⊆ [n]
are not chosen uniformly at random. Instead, the proba-
bility p that honest Bob learns the value of Xi for i ∈ [n]
is equal to the probability that he chooses the same basis
as Alice, i.e., p = 1/(d+ 1). In the definition below, we
will need to talk about distributions over subsets I ⊆ [n].
Clearly, the probability that Bob learns a particular sub-
set I satisfies
Pr(I) = p|I|(1− p)n−|I| (A1)
Note that we can write the subset I as a string
(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ {0, 1}n where yi = 1 if and only if i ∈ I,
allowing us to identify |I〉 := |y1〉⊗ . . .⊗ |yn〉. The prob-
ability distribution over subsets I ⊆ [n] can then be ex-
pressed as (see also [13])
Ψ(p) :=
∑
I⊆2[n]
p|I|(1− p)n−|I||I〉〈I| . (A2)
Furthermore, we will follow the notation of [13] and use
τS :=
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
|s〉〈s| , (A3)
to denote the uniform distribution over a set S.
7Definition 1 (Non-uniform WSE). An (n, λ, ε, p, d)–
WSE scheme is a protocol between A and B satisfying the
following properties:
Correctness: If both parties are honest, then there
exists an ideal state σXnIXI is defined such that:
1. The joint distribution of the n-dit string Xn and
subset I is given by
σXnI = τ{0,1,...,d−1}n ⊗Ψ(p) , (A4)
2. The joint state ρAB created by the real protocol is
equal to the ideal state: ρAB = σXnIXI where we
identify (A,B) with (Xn, IXI).
Security for Alice: If A is honest, then there exists
an ideal state σXnB′ such that
1. The amount of information B′ gives Bob about Xn
is limited:
1
n
H∞(X
n|B′)σ ≥ λ (A5)
2. The joint state ρAB′ created by the real protocol is
ε-close to the ideal state, i.e. σXnB′ ≈ε ρAB′ where
we identify (Xn, B′) with (A,B′).
Security for Bob: If B is honest, then there exists
ideal state σA′XˆnI where Xˆ
n ∈ {0, 1, ..., d− 1}n and I ⊆
[n] such that
1. The random variable I is independent of A′Xˆn and
distributed over 2[n] according to the probability dis-
tribution given by (A1):
σA′XˆnI = σA′Xˆn ⊗Ψ(p) . (A6)
2. The joint state ρA′B created by the real protocol is
equal to the ideal state: ρA′B = σA′(IXˆI), where we
identify (A′, B) with (A′, IXˆI).
We are now ready to state our result for non-uniform
weak string erasure more formally. We first state the
general result for quantum memories, and then focus on
the tensor-product channels of the type F = N⊗ν·n.
Theorem 2. (i) Let δ ∈]0, 12 [ and let Bob’s storage be
given by F : B(Hin) → B(Hout). Then Protocol 1
is an (n, λ(δ, d), ε(δ, d), 1/(d+ 1), d)–WSE protocol
with min-entropy rate
λ(δ, d) = − lim
n→∞
1
n
PFsucc ((log(d+ 1)− 1− δ) · n) ,
and error ε(δ, d) = 2 exp(−f(δ, d)n) with
f(δ, d) :=
(δ/4)2
32
(
log((d + 1) · d) + log 4δ
)2 > 0. (A7)
(ii) Suppose F = N⊗νn for a storage rate ν > 0, N
satisfying the strong-converse property and having
capacity CN bounded by
CN · ν < log(d+ 1)− 1 .
Let δ ∈]0, 12 − CN · ν[. Then Protocol 1 is an
(n, λ˜(δ, d), ε(δ, d), 1/(d + 1), d)–WSE protocol for
sufficiently large n, where
λ˜(δ, d) = ν · γN
(
log(d+ 1)− 1− δ
ν
)
.
Note that when N = Id then CN = log d, so that the
bound in (A14) holds for a storage rate of
ν <
log(d+ 1)− 1
log d
≈ 1, for large d.
Thus for the case of bounded storage, security can in
principle be obtained for any storage rate ν < 1, provided
we choose a large enough system size d.
1. Security for honest Alice
Let us now first consider the case of dishonest Bob.
The main difference from [13] in proving security lies in
the use of the uncertainty relation for the full set of d+1
mutually unbiased bases in prime power dimensions [17].
To see where we will make use of this relation, note that
analogous to [13] we can model Bob’s attack as a CPTP
map E : B((Cd)⊗n)→ B(Hin⊗HK). Then, for any input
state ρ ∈ (Cd)⊗n provided by Alice before the waiting
time, he obtains an output state ζQinK = E(ρ), where
Qin is the quantum information he puts into his quantum
storage and K is any additional classical information he
retains. Hence, the joint state of Alice and Bob before
his storage noise is applied is of the form
ρXnΘnKQin =
1
dn(d+ 1)n
∑
xn,θn,k
PK|Xn=xn,Θn=θn(k)
|xn〉〈xn| ⊗ |θn〉〈θn|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Alice
⊗ |k〉〈k| ⊗ ζxnθnk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob
(A8)
where ζxnθnk is the state on Hin depending on Alice’s
choice of string xn, bases θn and Bob’s classical informa-
tion k. Bob’s storage then undergoes noise described
by F : B(Hin) → B(Hout), and the state evolves to
ρXnΘnKF(Qin). After time ∆t Bob also receives the basis
info Θn = θn. Then their joint state is
ρXnΘnKF(Qin) =
1
dn(d+ 1)n
∑
xn,θn,k
PK|Xn=xn,Θn=θn(k)
|xn〉〈xn|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Alice
⊗ |θn〉〈θn| ⊗ F(ζxnθnk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob B’
(A9)
where Bob now holds B′ = ΘnKF(Qin).
8Our goal is to show that for any cheating strategy of
dishonest Bob, his min-entropy about the string Xn =
(X1, ..., Xn) is large, using an entropic uncertainty rela-
tion. Recall that the set of (d + 1) MUBs in Cd satis-
fies [17] (see [32] for a simple proof)
1
d+ 1
d+1∑
i=1
H(Bi|ρ) ≥ log(d+ 1)− 1, ∀ ρ ∈ Cd, (A10)
where
H(Bi|ρ) = −
∑
x
Tr(|bxi 〉〈b
x
i |ρ) logTr(|b
x
i 〉〈b
x
i |ρ) (A11)
is the Shannon entropy of the probability distribution
induced by measuring the state ρ in the basis Bi. This
lower bound, along with the uncertainty relation for the
smooth min-entropy from [23, Theorem 4.22] gives
Hε/2∞ (X
n|Θn)ρ ≥
(
log(d+ 1)− 1−
δ
2
)
n (A12)
for any 0 < δ < 12 with
ε = 2 exp
(
−
(δ/4)2n
32
(
log((d+ 1) · d) + log 4δ
)2
)
. (A13)
Finally, we make use of Lemma 2.2 in [13] that relates
the smooth min-entropy to the maximal decoding prob-
ability, PFsucc, to get,
Hε∞(X
n|ΘnKF(Qin))ρ
≥ − logPFsucc
(
n
(
log(d+ 1)− 1− δ2
)
− log 2ε
)
≥ − logPFsucc
(
n(log(d+ 1)− 1)− n δ2
)
where the second inequality follows from the monotonic-
ity of PFsucc and the fact that log
2
ε <
δ
2n for 0 < δ <
1
2 .
By definition of the smooth min-entropy, this implies that
there exists an ideal state σXnB′ such that
1. σXnB′ ≈ε ρXnB′ ,
2. 1nH∞(X
n|B′)σ ≥ −
1
n logP
F
succ
(
n log(d+ 1)− n− δ2n
)
,
which proves part (i) of Theorem 2.
In the special case that F is the tensor product chan-
nel F = N⊗νn, where N satisfies the strong converse
property and CN · ν < log(d+1)− 1, following the same
steps as in [13] we obtain that there exists an ideal state
σXnB′ that is ε-close to ρXnB′ and has a min-entropy
1
n
H∞(X
n|B′)σ ≥ ν.γ
N
(
log(d+ 1)− 1− δ2
ν
)
> 0 ,
(A14)
where γN (·) is the strong converse parameter of the chan-
nel N [15]. This proves part (ii) of Theorem 2.
2. Security for honest Bob
The proof of security when Alice is dishonest is es-
sentially analogous to [13] (see Section 3.4 and Figures
7 and 8), where we introduce an imaginary “simulator”
with perfect quantum memory to define the desired ideal
state. We hence merely state how to adapt the proof
of [13]: here we naturally obtain Ψ(p) in place of the uni-
form distribution τ2[n] in our simulation. Similarly, the
subset I is not chosen uniformly at random, but with
probability
Pr(I) :=
(
1
d+ 1
)|I|(
d
d+ 1
)n−|I|
. (A15)
Appendix B: Oblivious Transfer from Weak String
Erasure
We are now ready to show how oblivious transfer can
be obtained even from the non-uniform variant of weak
string erasure. To formally state our result we begin with
the definition of oblivious transfer from [13].
Definition 2. An (ℓ, ε)–fully randomized oblivious
transfer (FROT) scheme is a protocol between Alice and
Bob satisfying the following:
Correctness: If both parties are honest, then the ideal
state σSℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC is defined such that
1. The distribution over Sℓ0, S
ℓ
1 and C is uniform:
σSℓ0Sℓ1C = τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ τ{0,1} .
2. The real state ρSℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ created during the pro-
tocol is ε-close to the ideal state:
ρSℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ ≈ε σSℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC , (B1)
where we identify A = (Sℓ0, S
ℓ
1) and B =
(C, Y ℓ).
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then there exists
an ideal state σSℓ0Sℓ1B′C , where C is a random vari-
able on {0, 1}, such that
1. Bob is ignorant about Sℓ1−C :
σSℓ1−CSℓCB′C ≈ε τ{0,1}ℓ ⊗ σSℓCB′C .
2. The real state ρSℓ0Sℓ1B′ created during the pro-
tocol is ε-close to the ideal state:
ρSℓ0Sℓ1B′ ≈ε σSℓ0Sℓ1B′ .
Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then there exists an
ideal state σA′Sℓ0Sℓ1C such that
91. Alice is ignorant about C:
σA′Sℓ0Sℓ1C = σA′Sℓ0Sℓ1 ⊗ τ{0,1} .
2. The real state ρA′CY ℓ created during the pro-
tocol is ε-close to the ideal state:
ρA′CY ℓ ≈ε σA′CSℓ
C
,
where we identify B = (C, Y ℓ).
In the main part of this text, we had restricted our-
selves to considering a simplified protocol containing all
the essential ideas of the protocol below. The actual pro-
tocol is very similar, but for technical reasons we will
work with m blocks of β elements each, instead of sam-
pling individual elements Xj . Fortunately, the proto-
col we will use for the case of non-uniform weak string
erasure remains the same as in the case of weak string
erasure with a small modification. Since p 6= 1/2, the ex-
pected number of dits Xj that Bob will learn is of course
no longer roughly n/2 as in the original setting [13]. This
requires the introduction of a new parameter η such that
with high probability Bob will learn n/η of the string’s
entries. We again require an encoding of subsets as
strings. Since our subsets will now be smaller, we choose
t such that 2t ≤
(
m
m/η
)
≤ 2 · 2t, and an injective encoding
Enc : {0, 1}t → T , where T is the set of possible sub-
sets of size m/η. Note that this again means that not all
subsets can be encoded but at least half of them will.
Protocol 2: WSE-to-FROT
Parameters: Set η := 2(d + 1). Integers n, β such that
m := n/β is a multiple of η. Outputs: (sℓ0, s
ℓ
1) ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ×
{0, 1}ℓ to Alice, and (c, yℓ) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}ℓ to Bob.
1: Alice and Bob: Execute [n, λ, ε, 1/(d + 1), d]–
WSE. Alice gets a string xn ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}n,
Bob a set I ⊂ [n] and a string s = xI . If |I| <
n/η, then Bob simply chooses Itr from all subsets
of size |I| = n/η uniformly at random. Otherwise,
he randomly truncates I to Itr of size n/η, and
deletes the corresponding values in s.
We arrange xn into a matrix z ∈
Mm×β({0, 1, . . . , d − 1}), by zj,α := x(j−1)·β+α for
(j, α) ∈ [m]× [β].
2: Bob:
1. Randomly chooses a string wt ∈R {0, 1}t cor-
responding to an encoding of a subset Enc(wt)
of [m] with m/η elements.
2. Randomly partitions the n dits of xn into m
blocks of β dits each: He randomly chooses
a permutation π : [m] × [β] → [m] × [β] of
the entries of z such that he knows π(z)Enc(wt)
(that is, these dits are permutation of the dits
of s). Formally, π is uniform over permuta-
tions satisfying the following condition: for
all (j, α) ∈ [m] × [β] and (j′, α′) := π(j, α),
we have (j − 1) · β + α ∈ I ⇔ j′ ∈ Enc(wt).
3. Bob sends π to Alice.
3: Alice and Bob: Execute interactive hashing with
Bob’s input equal to wt. They obtain wt0, w
t
1 ∈
{0, 1}t with wt ∈ {wt0, w
t
1}.
4: Alice: Chooses r0, r1 ∈R R and sends them to
Bob.
5: Alice: Outputs (sℓ0, s
ℓ
1) :=
(Ext(π(z)Enc(wt0),r0),Ext(π(z)Enc(wt1),r1)).
6: Bob: Computes c, where wt = wtc, and
π(z)Enc(wt) from s. He outputs (c, y
ℓ) :=
(c,Ext(π(z)Enc(wt),rc)).
Theorem 3 (Oblivious Transfer). For any ω ≥ (d +
1) and β ≥ max{67, 256ω2/λ2}, the protocol WSE-to-
FROT implements an (ℓ, 43 ·2
− λ
2
512ω2β
n
+2ε)–FROT from
one instance of of [n, λ, ε, p, d]–non-uniform WSE, where
ℓ :=
⌊((
ω−1
ω
)
λ
4(d+1) −
λ2
512ω2β
)
n− 12
⌋
.
1. Security for Bob
We first show that the protocol is secure against a
cheating Alice. This can again be done following the
steps of [13] taking the non-uniformity into account. For-
mally, let ρ˜A′′CY ℓ denote the joint state at the end of the
protocol, where A′′ is the quantum output of a malicious
Alice and (C, Y ℓ) is the classical output of an honest Bob.
Following the same steps as in [13] we can construct an
ideal state σ˜A′′W ℓ0W ℓ1C = σ˜A′′W ℓ0W ℓ1 ⊗ τ{0,1} that satisfies
ρ˜A′′CY ℓ = σ˜A′′CW ℓ
C
= σ˜A′′CSℓ
C
.
It now again remains to be shown that Alice does not
learn anything about C, that is, σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1C = σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1 ⊗
τ{0,1}. From the properties of non-uniform WSE it fol-
lows that σA′XˆnI = σA′Xˆn⊗Ψ(1/(d+1)). Since Bob ran-
domly truncates I to Itr such that |Itr| = n/η, the trun-
cated set is independent of A′. Furthermore, although I
is not distributed uniformly over 2[n], we can show that
the truncated set Itr is indeed distributed uniformly over
all subsets of size n/η. Intuitively this follows from the
fact that the distribution of the set I depends only on
|I|, the number of elements in I. Formally, the probabil-
ity of a given truncated set Itr can be written in terms
of the probability p(A¯) that |I| ≥ n/η as follows
p(Itr|A¯) =
∑
I⊆[n]
|I|≥n/η
p(I|A¯)( |I|
n/η
) p(|I| ≥ n/η) (B2)
=
1
p(A¯)
∑
I
p(I)( |I|
n/η
) ,
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independent of the choice of truncation. Here 1/
( |I|
n/η
)
is the probability that we pick a particular Itr from the
original I and p(I|A¯) is the conditional probability of a
set I, given that Bob obtains a sufficient number of in-
dices. The last step is simply an application of Bayes’
rule, p(A¯)p(I|A¯) = p(A¯|I)p(I) where p(A¯|I) = 1 for the
subsets I in the sum. Note that if |I| < n/η then Bob
chooses a subset of the desired size uniformly at random
from all subsets of size |I| = n/η and hence Pr(Itr) is al-
ways uniform. Hence, conditioned on any fixedW t = wt,
the permutation Π is uniform and independent of A′. It
follows that the string W t is also uniform and indepen-
dent of A′ and Π. From the properties of interactive
hashing we are guaranteed that C is uniform and inde-
pendent of Alice’s view afterwards, and hence,
σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1C = σ˜A′′Sℓ0Sℓ1 ⊗ τ{0,1} .
2. Security for Alice
The security proof for the case that Bob is dishonest
is analogous to [13], this time employing [13, Lemma 2.5]
with a subset size of |S| = m/η.
3. Correctness
It remains to prove that if both parties are honest,
then honest Bob can indeed learn the desired SC . This
requires us to show that for our choice of η, Bob can learn
sufficiently many indices i ∈ [n].
Lemma 1 (Correctness). Protocol WSE-to-FROT sat-
isfies correctness with an error of
43 · 2
− λ
2
512ω2β
n
.
First we show using the Hoeffding bound [24], that
the probability that a subset of [n] where each entry is
chosen with probability p = 1/(d+ 1) has less than n/η
elements is at most exp(−2n/η2). Consider a sequence of
independent random variables {X1, . . . , Xn}, which are
bounded as follows: Pr(Xi − E(Xi) ∈ [ai, bi]) = 1, ∀1 <
i < n. Then, Hoeffding’s inequality states that the sum
S = X1 + . . .+Xn satisfies,
Pr(E(S)− S ≥ t) ≤ exp
(
−
2t2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)
2
)
(B3)
In our context, Xi is the binary variable which takes
on the value 1 if the index i ∈ I, and 0 otherwise. The
sum S is thus simply equal to |I|, the number of elements
in the index set I, which is a random subset of [n]. For
the case of d+ 1 encodings, Pr(Xi = 1) = 1/(d+ 1) and
Pr(Xi = 0) = d/(d + 1), so that the expectation value
satisfies
E(S) = E(|I|) =
n
d+ 1
. (B4)
Furthermore, we can take ai = 0 and bi = 1 for all i.
Applying Hoeffding’s inequality to the sum S = |I| gives
Pr(
n
d+ 1
− |I| ≥
n
d+ 1
−
n
η
) ≤
exp
(
−2n
[
1
d+ 1
−
1
η
]2)
. (B5)
Rearranging terms, we obtain the probability that a ran-
dom set I has less than n/η elements:
Pr(|I| ≤
n
η
) ≤ exp
(
−2n
[
1
d+ 1
−
1
η
]2)
. (B6)
Since our work is mainly a proof of principle, we do not
yet care about optimality or efficiency. We simply pick
a choice of η that will satisfy this condition, and set η =
2(d+ 1). Thus, the probability that a random subset of
[n] has less than n/η elements is at most exp(−2n/η2).
Let ξ := 2−n/η
2
. We have to show that the state
ρ˜Sℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ at the end of the protocol is close to the given
ideal state σ˜Sℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC . As shown above, the probability
that a subset of [n] has less than n/η elements is at most
exp(−2n/η2) ≤ ξ . (B7)
Hence, the probability that Bob does not learn suffi-
ciently many indices when both parties are honest is at
most ξ. Let A be the event that |I| ≥ n/η. It remains to
show that the state ρ˜Sℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ|A is close to the given ideal
state σSℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC .
Note that the correctness condition of WSE ensures
that the state created by WSE is equal to ρXnIXI =
σXnIXI , where σXnI = τ{0,1,...,d−1}n ⊗ Ψ(1/(d + 1)).
Since I0 and I1 are chosen independently of Xn, XI0
and XI1 have a min-entropy of n/η each. Since ℓ ≤
n/2η ≤ n/η− 2 log 1/ξ, it follows from privacy amplifica-
tion that SℓC is independent and ξ-close to uniform. Since
dishonest Bob is only more powerful than honest Bob, we
furthermore have from the proof against dishonest Bob
that Sℓ1−C is independent and uniform except with an
error of at most εˆ = 41 · 2
− λ
2
512ω2β
n
, where we used the
fact that Bob is also honest during weak string erasure
(ε = 0). Finally, by the same arguments showing security
for Bob we have that C is uniform and independent of
Sℓ0 and S
ℓ
1. Hence,
ρSℓ0Sℓ1C|A ≈ξ+εˆ σSℓ0Sℓ1C .
Since the extra condition on the permutation Π implies
that Bob can indeed calculate Π(Z)Enc(W ) from XI , we
have that Y ℓ = SℓC . Using Pr[A] ≥ 1− ξ, we get
ρSℓ0Sℓ1CY ℓ ≈2ξ+εˆ σSℓ0Sℓ1CSℓC .
Finally, λ ≤ 1, β > 1 and ω ≥ (d + 1) give us 1/η2 =
1/(4(d + 1)2) > λ2/(512ω2β). Adding up all errors and
noting that
2 · 2
− 1
η2
n
≤ 2 · 2
− λ
2
512ω2β
n
,
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gives our claim.
